U.S. Policy Toward North Korea

By Donna Downes Knox

 

 

It seems that North Korea has come to believe that there will be no real consequences attached to a failure to cooperate on the POW/MIA accounting.   They held up the repatriation of four sets of remains last spring, which caused three recovery operations to be canceled and placed the whole recovery program in pause for a good six months.  They then allowed one joint operation, but soon demanded a humanitarian aid package before any further remains recovery operations would be planned.  DPMO estimates the cost of their demand to be somewhere between 20 and 40 million dollars.  Several months later, the two sides are still talking about meeting, but nothing has moved along.

 

Meanwhile, higher-level    U.S. and N.K. officials have met in New York to discuss a broad range of issues between the two countries, with an eye toward further development of bi-lateral relations.  These talks presented an important opportunity to impress upon the North Korean government that the United States government is serious about getting the fullest possible accounting for its missing servicemen.  If that message were not conveyed in these talks, then how or when would it be conveyed with any credibility? 

 

And yet, we are told by the State Department that the POW/MIA issue was raised in these talks only ‘marginally’, by someone other than the delegation heads, and the position focused on remains recovery because the North Koreans have made it clear that they are not willing to discuss the issue of unrepatriated Americans. 

 

The issue of missing servicemen, purportedly one of the nation’s highest priorities, got an “Oh, by the way...” partial mention in the margins by the underling of an underling.    This does not make governments sit up and take notice. 

 

And why would the State Department allow the North Koreans to limit the agenda, thereby removing from the table any discussion of the issue of live Americans?  We’ve got South Korean POWs from the Korean War escaping from North Korea left and right these days.  We’ve had all sorts of live sightings of Americans in North Korea right into the 1990s.  DPMO says it can’t ‘confirm’ them.  That is not surprising, and it is not justification for letting the issue fade into the margins...or beyond.

 

The issue of missing servicemen...much larger than the project of remains recovery...should be at the top of this government’s real priority list.   The Clinton/Gore Administration’s policy toward North Korea plainly is not structured that way. 

 

Last November, after holding hearings on the subject of North Korea’s threat to U.S. security, New York Congressman Ben Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, wrote that “...the United States has replaced the Soviet Union as the primary benefactor of North Korea, with some $645 million in aid over the past five years. We supply half of North Korea’s heavy fuel oil needs and feed one third of the population.  It is as if some foreign power fed 90 million Americans each day.”

 

The U.S. plays an enormous role in North Korea’s economic viability.  This should give us substantial collateral with the North Korean government.  And yet, we appear to be tippy toeing around them, afraid to ruffle feathers.  This Administration’s foreign policy has allowed North Korea to put the United States on the defensive.  All North Korea has to do is threaten peace, and the money and concessions keep rolling in. 

 

It becomes no wonder that we have seen stalled and irrational negotiations that eat up time like it doesn’t matter.   It becomes perfectly clear why we have seen no meaningful cooperation on the question of unrepatriated American servicemen.  Simply put...they have nothing to gain and plenty to risk.

 

North Korea, China, Russia and the other relevant countries should be required to bring to the table meaningful results on the question of missing American servicemen, as a part of agreements that offer them such benefits as American aid, American technology, alliance with the American military, and preferred trading status with this country.  Diplomatic chitchat won’t get the job done.  Neither will empty lip service in Veterans Day speeches.  What we need is a foreign policy that is intended to get real answers to the hardest questions.

 


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